Abstract. Predicate encryption is a recent generalization of identitybased encryption (IBE), broadcast encryption, attribute-based encryption, and more. A natural question is whether there exist black-box constructions of predicate encryption based on generic building blocks, e.g., trapdoor permutations. Boneh et al. (FOCS 2008) recently gave a negative answer for the specific case of IBE. We show both negative and positive results. First, we identify a combinatorial property on the sets of predicates/attributes and show that, for any sets having this property, no black-box construction of predicate encryption from trapdoor permutations (or even CCA-secure encryption) is possible. Our framework implies the result of Boneh et al. as a special case, and also rules out, e.g., black-box constructions of forward-secure encryption and broadcast encryption (with many excluded users). On the positive side, we identify conditions under which predicate encryption schemes can be constructed based on any CPA-secure (standard) encryption scheme.
Introduction
In a predicate encryption scheme [6, 13] an authority generates a master public key and a master secret key, and uses the master secret key to derive personal secret keys for individual users. A personal secret key corresponds to a predicate in some class F, and ciphertexts are associated (by the sender) with an attribute in some set A; a ciphertext associated with the attribute I ∈ A can be decrypted by a secret key SK f corresponding to the predicate f ∈ F if and only if f (I) = 1. The basic security guarantee provided by such schemes is that a ciphertext associated with an attribute I hides all information about the underlying message unless one has a personal secret key giving the explicit ability to decrypt; in other words, if an adversary A holds keys SK f1 , . . . , SK f for which f 1 (I) = · · · = f (I) = 0, then A should learn nothing about the message. (A formal definition is given later.)
By choosing F and A appropriately, predicate encryption yields as special cases many notions that are interesting in their own right. For example, by taking A = {0, 1} n and letting F = {f ID } ID∈{0,1} n be the class of point functions (so that f ID (ID ) = 1 iff ID = ID ) we recover the notion of identity-based encryption (IBE) [19, 4] . Similarly, it can be observed that predicate encryption encompasses fuzzy IBE [18] , forward-secure (public-key) encryption [7] , (publickey) broadcast encryption [9] , attribute-based encryption [11, 2, 15] , and more as special cases.
Most (though not all) existing constructions of predicate encryption schemes rely on bilinear maps. A natural question is: what are the minimal assumptions on which predicate encryption can be based? Of course, the answer will depend on the specific predicate class F and attribute set A of interest; in particular, Boneh and Waters [6] show that if F is polynomial size then (for any A) one can construct a predicate encryption scheme for (F, A) from any (standard) publickey encryption scheme. On the other hand, Boneh et al. [5] have recently shown that there is no black-box construction of IBE from trapdoor permutations.
Our Results
The specific question we consider is: for which (F, A) can we construct a predicate encryption scheme over (F, A) based on CPA-secure encryption? We show both negative and positive results. Before describing these results in more detail, we provide some background intuition.
A natural combinatorial construction of a predicate encryption scheme over some (F, A) from a CPA-secure encryption scheme (Gen, Enc, Dec) is as follows: The authority includes several public keys pk 1 , . . . , pk q in the master public key, and each personal secret key is some subset of the corresponding secret keys sk 1 , . . . , sk q . Encryption of a message m with respect to an attribute I requires "sharing" m in some way to yield m 1 , . . . , m q , and the resulting ciphertext is Enc pk1 (m 1 ), . . . , Enc pkq (m q ). Intuitively, this works if:
Correctness: Let SK f = {sk i1 , . . . , sk it } be a personal secret key for which f (I) = 1. Then the "shares" m i 1 , . . . , m i t should enable recovery of m.
Roughly, our negative result can be interpreted as showing that this is essentially the only way to construct predicate encryption (in a black-box way) from CPAsecure encryption; our positive result shows how to implement the above for a specific class of predicate encryption schemes. We now provide further details.
Impossibility results. Our negative results are in the same model used by Boneh et al. [5] , which builds on the model used in the seminal work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [12] . Specifically, as in [5] our negative results hold relative to a random oracle (with trapdoor) and so rule out black-box constructions from trapdoor permutations as well as from any (standard) CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme.
A slightly informal statement of our result follows. Fix {(F n , A n )} n∈N , a sequence of predicate classes and attribute sets indexed by the security parameter n. We say that {(F n , A n )} n can be q-covered if for every set system
, there are polynomially-many predicates f * , f 1 , . . . , f p ∈ F n such that, with high probability:
{(F n , A n )} n is easily covered if it is q-covered for every polynomial q. We show: 
Request the challenge ciphertext C to be encrypted using an attribute I for which This constitutes a valid attack since SK f * suffices to decrypt C yet the adversary only requested SK f 1 , . . . , SK f p , none of which suffices on its own to decrypt C.
Turning this intuition into a formal proof must, in particular, implicitly show that the combinatorial approach sketched earlier is essentially the only black-box approach to building predicate encryption schemes from trapdoor permutations. Moreover, we actually prove a stronger quantitative version of the above theorem showing, roughly, that if {(F n , A n )} n is q-covered then any predicate encryption scheme over {(F n , A n )} n must use at least q + 1 underlying encryption keys.
One might wonder whether the "easily covered" condition is useful for determining whether there exist black-box constructions of predicate encryption schemes over {(F n , A n )} n of interest. We show that it is, in that the following corollary can be proven fairly easily given the above:
Corollary There are no black-box constructions of (1) property: for each I ∈ A n there are at most polynomially-many f ∈ F n for which f (I) = 0; i.e., for each I there are at most polynomially-many predicates that are "excluded". (The positive result from [6] , where there are only polynomiallymany predicates, is thus obtained as a corollary.) This is proved by analogy to broadcast encryption, using the combinatorial techniques from [14] .
Comparison to the Results of Boneh et al.
Our proof relies heavily on the impossibility result from [5] . Our contribution lies in finding the right combinatorial generalization (specifically, the "easily covered" property described earlier) of the specific property used by Boneh et al. for the particular case of IBE, adapting their proof to our setting, and applying their ideas to the more general case of predicate encryption. Our generalization, in turn, allows us to show impossibility for several cryptosystems of interest besides IBE (cf. the corollary stated earlier), as well as to give quantitative versions of their earlier result. Our positive results have no analogue in [5] .
Definitions

Predicate Encryption
We provide a functional definition of predicate encryption, followed by a weak definition of security that we use when proving impossibility and the standard definition of security [13] that we use when proving our positive result.
where F n is a set of (efficiently computable) predicates over the set of attributes A n . A predicate encryption scheme over {F n , A n } n∈N consists of four ppt algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) such that:
-Setup is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a master secret key M SK ∈ {0, 1} n and outputs a master public key M P K. -KeyGen is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input the master secret key M SK and a predicate f ∈ F n and outputs a secret key SK f = KeyGen M SK (f ). 
(The assumption that KeyGen is deterministic is without loss of generality, since M SK may include a key for a pseudorandom function.) -Enc takes as input the public key M P K, an attribute
It is required that for all
Definition 2. A predicate encryption scheme over (F, A) is weakly payload hiding if the advantage of any ppt adversary A in the following game is negligible: . Our construction of Section 5 can be modified to achieve the even stronger notion of attribute hiding; we refer to [13] for a definition.
A Random Trapdoor Permutation Oracle
We assume the reader is familiar with the usual model in which black-box impossibility results are proved; see [12, 17, 5] for further details. We show an oracle O relative to which trapdoor permutations and CCA-secure encryption exist, yet any construction of a predicate encryption scheme (for certain (F, A)) relative to O is insecure against a polynomial-time adversary given access to O and a PSPACE oracle. Our oracle O = (g, e, d) is defined as follows, for each n ∈ N:
-g is chosen uniformly from the space of permutations on {0, 1} n . We view g as taking a secret key sk as input, and returning a public key pk.
n maps a public key pk and a "message" m ∈ {0, 1} n to a "ciphertext" c ∈ {0, 1} n . It is chosen uniformly subject to the constraint that e(pk, ·) is a permutation on {0, 1} n for every pk.
n maps a secret key sk and a ciphertext c to a message m. We require that d(sk, c) outputs the unique m for which e(g(sk), m) = c.
With overwhelming probability O is a trapdoor permutation [10, 5] . Moreover, since the components of O are chosen at random subject to the above constraints (and not with some "defect" as in, e.g., [10] ), O implies CCA-secure encryption [1] .
We denote a query α to O as, e.g., α def = [g(sk) = pk] and similarly for e and d queries. In describing our attack in the next section, we often use a partial oracle O that is defined only on some subset of the possible inputs. We always enforce that such oracles be consistent: n , and all sk such that g (sk) = pk is defined, the value e (pk, x) = c is defined if and only if d (sk, c) = x is defined.
An Impossibility Result for Predicate Encryption
We define a combinatorial property on (F n , A n ) and formally state our impossibility result. We describe in Section 3.1 an adversary A attacking any black-box construction of a predicate encryption scheme satisfying the conditions of our theorem; an analysis of A is given in Appendix A and the full version.
Fix a set F and a positive integer q, and let
sequence of predicates and attributes. We say {(F
) is deterministic and outputs I ∈ A n with f (I) = 1, such that for n sufficiently large:
then with probability at least 4/5,
Although the above definition may seem rather complex and hard to use, we show in Section 4 that it can be applied quite easily to several interesting classes of predicate encryption schemes. Moreover, the definition is natural given the attack we will describe in the following section. A black-box construction of predicate encryption is q-bounded if each of its algorithms makes at mostueries to O. We now state our main result: Since each algorithm defining the predicate encryption scheme can make at most polynomially-many queries to its oracle, we have Corollary 1. If {(F n , A n )} is easily covered, there is no black-box construction of a weakly payload-hiding predicate encryption scheme over {(F n , A n )} from trapdoor permutations (or CCA-secure encryption).
The Attack
Fix an {(F n , A n )} that can be q-covered, and let PE = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be a predicate encryption scheme over {(F n , A n )} each of whose algorithms makes at most q = poly(n) queries to O = (g, e, d) . We assume, without loss of generality, that before any algorithm of PE makes a query of the form [d(sk, )], it first makes the query [g(sk)].
We begin the proof of Theorem 1 by describing an adversary A attacking PE. Adversary A is given access to O and makes a polynomial number of calls to this oracle; as described, A is not efficient but it runs in polynomial time given access to a PSPACE-complete oracle (or if P = N P) and this suffices to prove black-box impossibility as in previous work [12, 17, 5] . Our description of the attack is directly motivated by the attacker described in [5] .
Let Step 1: Discovering important public keys. For i = 1 to p, adversary A does the following:
, and choose random b ← {0, 1} and r ← {0, 1} n .
Compute Dec
Step 2: Discovering frequent queries for I * . A repeats the following q · p 3 times: Choose random b ← {0, 1} and r ← {0, 1} n ; compute Enc
Step 3: Discovering secret queries and decrypting the challenge. A chooses k ← [q · p 3 ] and runs the following k times. 
A uniformly generates a secret key M SK and a consistent partial oracle O for which (1) Setup O (M SK ) = M P K; (2) for all i it holds that
We denote by L the set of queries in O that are not in L (the "invented queries"). Note that |L | ≤ q·(p+2), since at mostueries are made by Setup and KeyGen(f ) makes at mostueries for each of SK f * , SK f 1 , . . . , SK f p .
A chooses b ← {0, 1} and r ← {0, 1}
n , and computes C := Enc
Output: A Outputs the bit b computed in the k th iteration of step 3.
Before defining the oracle O used above, we introduce some notation. Let L, O , and M SK be as above, and note that we can view L and O as a tuple of (partial) functions (g, e, d) and (g , e , d ) where g , e , and d extend g, e, and d, respectively. Define the following:
-Q S is the set of pk for which [g (sk) = pk] is queried during computation of
-L g is the set of pk for which the query [g(sk) = pk] is in L.
Note that A can compute each of these sets from its view. Note further that Q S , Q K , Q K−S , O are fixed throughout an iteration of step 3, but L g may change as queries are answered.
Oracle O is defined as follows. For any query whose answer is defined by O , return that answer. Otherwise: An analysis of A, proving Theorem 1, appears in Appendix A and the full version of our paper. The analysis is very similar to the one given in [5] , with the main difference being Proposition 1.
Impossibility for Specific Cases
We use Theorem 1 to rule out black-box constructions of predicate encryption schemes in several specific cases of interest. Specifically, we consider the cases of identity-based encryption, forward-secure encryption, and broadcast encryption. We begin with a useful lemma. 
Lemma 1. Fix q(·), and assume {(F n
, there are at most q values i ∈ {1, . . . , 5q} for which S f i i<j≤5q S f j . (By convention, the union is the empty set if j = 5q.)
there can be at most q indices i where this occurs.
Fixing an arbitrary F n -set system {S f } f ∈Fn over [q], let I ⊂ {1, . . . , 5q} be the set of indices for which S fi ⊆ i<j≤q S fj ; the claim above shows that |I| ≥ 4q. If A 1 chooses i ∈ I then:
Since A 1 chooses i ∈ I with probability 4/5, this proves the lemma.
We now apply Lemma 1 to several specific cases.
Identity-based encryption. It is easy to see that IBE for identities {I n } can be viewed as an instance of predicate encryption by setting A n = I n and
Let N = |I n | denote the size of the identity space. Boneh et al. [5] already rule out black-box constructions of IBE from trapdoor permutations for N = ω(poly(n)); the next theorem shows that our Theorem 1 generalizes their result: Proof. Let I n = {ID 1 , . . . , ID 5N }. It is not hard to see that {(F n , A n )} n∈N can be N -covered: take f ID1 , . . . , f ID 5N and set I i = ID i for all i. Then apply Theorem 1.
Forward-secure public-key encryption. In a forward-secure public-key encryption scheme [7] secret keys are associated with time periods; the secret key at time period i enables decryption for ciphertexts encrypted at any time j ≥ i. (We refer the reader to [7] for further discussion.) A forward-secure encryption scheme supporting N = N (n) time periods can be cast as a predicate encryption scheme by letting A n = {1, . . . , N } and F n = {f i } 1≤i≤N where
(A forward-secure encryption scheme imposes the additional requirement that SK f i+1 can be derived from SK f i ; since we do not impose this requirement our impossibility result is even stronger.) A black-box construction of a forwardsecure encryption scheme from any CPA-secure encryption scheme exists for any N = poly(n): the master public key contains public keys {pk 1 , . . . , pk N }, and the secret key at period i is SK f i = {sk i , . . . , sk N }; encryption at period j uses pk j . While such a scheme is trivial as far as forward-secure encryption goes (since the public/secret key lengths are linear in N ), it satisfies the definition. The next theorem indicates that, in some sense, this trivial construction is almost optimal as far as black-box constructions are concerned; moreover, there is no black-box construction supporting a super-polynomial number of time periods. (In contrast, there exist schemes based on specific assumptions [7, 3] that support an unbounded number of time periods.) Proof. {(F n , A n )} n∈N can be N -covered, as taking f 1 , . . . , f 5N and setting I i = i for all i satisfies the conditions of Lemma 1. Then apply Theorem 1.
Broadcast encryption. Finally, we look at the case of (public-key) broadcast encryption [9] . Here, there is a fixed public key and a set of users U = {1, . . . , U } each with their own personal secret key; it should be possible for a sender to encrypt a message in such a way that only some subset U ⊂ U of users can decrypt. Consider the case where at most k = k(n) < U users are excluded; we refer to this as k-exclusion broadcast encryption. This can also be modeled by predicate encryption, if we let A n = {U ⊆ U | |U | ≥ U − k} and define F n = {f i } i∈U where Proof. We show that {(F n , A n )} n∈N can be k-covered. Take f 1 , . . . , f 5k and define
for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5k}. (So I 5k = U.) Note that |I i | ≥ U − 5k always, and these satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1. Applying Theorem 1 concludes the proof.
A Possibility Result for Predicate Encryption
Here we show that for the class of predicates and attributes {(F n , A n )} where (roughly) for each I ∈ A n there are at most polynomially-many f ∈ F n with f (I) = 0, there is a black-box construction of a predicate encryption scheme over {(F n , A n )} based on any CPA-secure encryption scheme. We remark that while we only prove payload hiding, our construction can in fact be shown to be attribute hiding [13] as well. Our construction relies on the notion of an (N, k)-cover free family [8] :
poly(n) there exist [14, 16] explicit, polynomialtime constructions of an (N, k)-cover free family over [U ] with |U | = poly(n).
(The specific results of [14, 16] can be used to improve the efficiency of the construction that follows, but our only goal here is to show a construction that can be implemented in polynomial time.) Theorem 5. Fix {(F n , A n )} and set Neg I def = {f ∈ F n : f (I) = 0} for I ∈ A n . If there is a poly-time algorithm ListNeg for which ListNeg(1 n , I) = Neg I , then there is a black-box construction of a predicate encryption scheme over {(F n , A n )} from any CPA-secure encryption scheme.
Proof. Since ListNeg runs in polynomial time, there is a polynomial k for which |Neg I | ≤ k(n) for all I ∈ A n . Say predicates in F n can be represented using (n) = poly(n) bits. Let {U n } be such that U n = poly(n) and such that, for each n, there is an explicit (2 (n) , k(n))-cover free family S = {S 1 , . . . , S 2 (n) } over [U n ]. Identifying F n with a subset of [2 (n) ], we can view the cover-free family as S = {S f } f ∈Fn .
Let (Gen , Enc , Dec ) be a CPA-secure encryption scheme. Our construction of a predicate encryption scheme over {(F n , A n )} is as follows:
-Setup, on input 1 n and a sufficiently long random string M SK, runs Gen (1 n ) a total of U = U n times to generate keys (pk 1 , sk 1 ) , . . . , (pk U , sk U ). The master public key is {pk 1 , . . . , pk U }.
-KeyGen, given the secret keys {sk i } U i=1 and a predicate f ∈ F n , outputs the subset {sk i } i∈S f .
-Enc, given the public key, an attribute I ∈ A n , and a message m, computes
where C i ← Enc pk i (m). -Dec, given the secret key {sk i } i∈S f for a predicate f and a ciphertext (I, {C i } i∈Ū ) for which f (I) = 1, first finds an index i for which i ∈ S f ∩Ū .
(Such an index must exist, since
and there are at most k predicates f that the union is taken over.) The output is Dec sk i (C i ).
It is easy to see that the above construction satisfies correctness. We now prove security (in the sense of Definition 3). Let A be an adversary attacking the scheme. We may assume without loss of generality that A never requests a secret key for a predicate f for which f (I * ) = 1 (where I * is the attribute used to encrypt the challenge ciphertext), since A cannot succeed if that occurs.
For simplicity we prove security in a non-uniform model, but the proof can be modified easily to hold in the uniform model in the standard way. We consider U +1 hybrid experiments H 0 , . . . , H U +1 , where H 0 corresponds to the experiment of Definition 3 when b = 0 is encrypted, and H U +1 corresponds to the experiment of Definition 3 when b = 1 is encrypted. Let δ i denote the probability that A outputs '0' in H i . We show that |δ i − δ i+1 | is negligible for all i; since U = U n is polynomial in n, this proves that |δ 0 − δ U +1 | is negligible and thus completes the proof.
Experiment H i is defined as follows: Steps 1 and 2 are exactly as in Definition 3. In step 3, however, when encrypting the challenge ciphertext for the attribute I * , letŪ * = [U ] \ Neg I * and set the ciphertext equal to I, {C j } j∈Ū * , where
A may continue to request secret keys as in Definition 3.
We now prove that |δ j − δ j+1 | is negligible for any j. Fix j and consider the following adversary A attacking the underlying encryption scheme (Gen , Enc , Dec ). Given public key pk and ciphertext C (which is either an encryption of 0 or 1), the adversary A proceeds as follows:
1. Set pk j = pk. For i = j, compute (pk i , sk i ) ← Gen (1 n ). Give the master public key {pk 1 , . . . , pk U } to A. 2. When A requests a secret key for a predicate f , then if j ∈ S f give to A the secret keys {sk i } i∈S f . Otherwise, abort and output a random bit. 3. When A outputs I * , compute Neg I * = ListNeg(I * ) and then set
If j ∈Ū * then abort and output a random bit. Otherwise, give A the ciphertext (I, {C i } i∈Ū * ) where 
